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Abstract—The increasing presence of decentralized renewable
generation in the power grid has motivated consumers to install
batteries to save excess energy for future use. The high price
of energy storage calls for a shared storage system, but careful
battery management is required so that the battery is operated
in a manner that is fair to all and as efficiently as possible. In
this paper, we study the tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness
in operating a shared battery. We develop a framework based
on constrained Markov decision processes to study both regimes,
namely, optimizing efficiency under a hard fairness constraint
and optimizing fairness under hard efficiency constraint. Our
results show that there are fundamental limits to efficiency
under fairness and vice-versa, and, in general, the two cannot
be achieved simultaneously. We characterize these fundamental
limits via absolute bounds on these quantities, and via the notion
of price of fairness that we introduce in this paper.
Index Terms—Smart grids, Battery management systems, Bat-
tery sharing
I. INTRODUCTION
The falling cost of solar panels and incentives for renewable
generation has created hope for massively decentralized power
generation. Islanded microgrids can install wind generators,
individual households, housing societies, and industries can
generate their own energy via solar panels, and reduce both,
their reliance on the grid and their carbon footprint. However,
unpredictability and unreliability of renewable energy also
necessitate battery backup to store excess energy, so that it
can be utilized at times when this generation is low. With
adequate battery backup, one can envision a future where there
is widespread deployment of renewable generation, leading to
a higher penetration of clean energy sources. A key component
in realizing this dream is the cost of the battery. While solar
panels have become inexpensive in the recent past, batteries
prices continue to be stiff and significant.
The high cost of battery storage has motivated communities
to look for sharing contracts that provide users access to
a common battery, leading to sharing of the overall costs.
The shared battery is expected to serve as collective storage
accessible by multiple users that can be utilized to store
excess generation, which users may want to withdraw at
times of deficit. However, like anyone who has used a shared
refrigerator at a dorm would realize, sharing of a storage space
brings with it concerns about the inequity of access and the
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possibility of other users ‘stealing’ one’s content. Clearly, gate-
keeping is required so that users access the battery in a manner
that is fair to all, and yet the battery is operated in an efficient
manner that fully exploits the investment made in installing
it. We are motivated by this question of fair and efficient
operation of a shared battery.
For the success of the sharing arrangement, it should ideally
allow each user to access the common battery as if it is wholly
owned by the user without jeopardizing the access of other
users. But if users have disparate generation characteristics,
excessive charging by one user may leave another user with
less opportunity to deposit his energy, diminishing equity of
access. At the other extreme, it is evident that without a
formal algorithm to do the gate-keeping, some users could
draw far more energy than they injected, thereby cannibalizing
the energy of other users.
Moreover, it seems plausible that gate-keeping may compel
the battery operator to decline requests for injection even while
there is room in the battery, or for withdrawal of energy even
there is energy in the battery. As a consequence, maintaining
fairness may come in the way of efficient battery operation. In
this paper, we develop a framework to quantify the tradeoffs
between efficiency and fairness in the operation of a shared
battery. Our work shows that there is a precise sense in
which the requirement of fairness fundamentally compromises
efficiency, and in general, the two cannot be achieved si-
multaneously. We also quantify the tradeoff by characterizing
the maximum efficiency achievable under fairness, and the
maximum fairness achievable under efficiency.
We consider a setting where N users with individual stochas-
tic net generation access a shared battery. The net generation
may be positive (in which case the user wishes to inject
energy) or negative (draw energy). We posit that a battery
management algorithm decides the amount of energy to accept
from injecting users and to provide to demanding users. We
adopt a general principle of fairness that no user should draw
more energy from the battery than it has injected into it.
However, since energy units added by users are fungible, in the
sense that they are indistinguishable from those added by other
users, the above principle need not be applied sequentially. The
battery management algorithm can allow users an ‘overdraft’,
where users can for some intervals, draw more energy from
the battery than they have injected thus far, so long as the
energy is ‘returned’ at a later stage. Specifically, in our notion
of fairness, we ask that for each user, the long-run time average
of the energy drawn from the battery by the user be no more
than the long-run time average of the energy injected. Our
notion of efficiency is the loss of load rate (LLR). The LLR
of user i is its long run time average of unmet demand.
We first study the problem of maximizing the efficiency
subject to hard constraints on fairness and derive fundamental
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2limits on the minimum total LLR attainable under fairness
constraints. We show that when there is at least one user that
is net demanding, i.e., has negative steady-state net generation
on average; the total LLR remains bounded away from zero
for any battery size. Remarkably, this is true even when the
total steady-state average net generation of all users is positive.
In contrast, in the absence of the fairness constraint, the total
LLR, in this case, would decrease exponentially with battery
size. When all users are net generative (i.e., with positive
steady state net generation on average), the LLR even with
the fairness constraint decreases to zero exponentially with
the battery size.
Given that the fairness constraint limits the efficient use of
the battery, we then ask the price of fairness. This is defined as
the ratio of the minimum attainable total LLR with the fairness
constraint, to that attained without the fairness constraint. Our
fundamental limits already show that this ratio approaches
infinity for large battery size when at least one user is net
demanding, but the system is net generative on the whole.
However, remarkably, we show that the price of fairness can
be arbitrarily large even all users are net generative.
Finally, we study the maximum fairness attainable under
efficient battery use. We find numerically that efficient battery
operation often compromises fairness for at least one user.
Moreover, that departure from the utopian fairness persists
even when one increases the battery size. This shows that
the conflict between efficiency and fairness is, in a sense,
fundamental and that a larger battery does not remedy it. These
results provide a natural motivation for devising a market for
energy wherein a user can inject its excess energy into the
battery, which can then be sold to other users. The precise
formulation for such a market is a point for future study.
Literature Survey
There is recent literature on the effects of energy/battery
sharing in power systems. The effects of sharing energy are
studied from a (non-cooperative) game-theoretic perspective
in [2]. The strategic decision is to choose the investment
in individual battery storage systems. On the other hand,
[3] views this problem from a coalition game perspective.
Investment in a shared battery and the corresponding allocation
scheme is studied in [4]. All these models assume the net
generation observed by the battery to be independent and
identically distributed random variables (i.i.d.) across time.
This seriously limits the applicability of the system as the net
generation is generally dependent across time. In contrast, we
consider Markov models for net generation, which can better
model the behaviour of renewable energy sources.
Markov energy generation models for scheduling of energy
storage have been considered in [5], [6]. [5] models the system
as a finite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) where the
decision of buying or selling electricity is made by an operator.
They provide threshold based heuristic policies and quantify
their suboptimality. [7] studies the problem of scheduling
and operation of energy storage for wind power plants. [8]
considers an infinite horizon discounted MDP based model to
determine the optimal amount of battery to be bought from
the grid to minimize the cost given a battery of fixed capacity.
These papers focus on providing structural results of optimal
policies and/or heuristic algorithms. On the other hand, we
consider a model in which we minimize the expected loss of
load if all demand is to be satisfied by only the renewable
generation and the common battery. Our main distinction is
the introduction of a notion of fairness, which, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been done before in the scheduling
of energy storage. Using this notion, we study the tradeoff
between efficiency and fairness in the operation of shared
energy storage systems.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
In general, we denote random variables by capital letters
and the value taken by a random variable is denoted by the
corresponding lower case letters. ∏i∈I Vi denotes the Cartesian
product of sets Vi, i ∈ I. {u, . . . ,v} is the set of integers from
u to v. [n] denotes the set {1, . . . ,n}.
B. Model
Consider n users {1, . . . ,n} equipped with stochastic net
generation evolving in discrete time. The net energy generation
of user i at time t be denoted by Xi(t) ∈ Si. A positive value
of Xi(t) indicates a net surplus at time t (i.e., user i generated
more energy than she consumed) whereas a negative value of
Xi(t) indicates a net deficit at time t (i.e., user i demanded more
energy than she generated). We assume an arbitrary positive
granularity with which energy generation/demand is measured;
this granularity is taken to be unity without loss of generality,
so that Si ⊂ Z. Let s+i denote the maximum energy user i
injects and −s−i denote the maximum energy user i demands,
i.e., s+i = maxs∈Si s and s
−
i = mins∈Si s. To avoid degenerate
scenarios, we assume that s+i > 0 and s
−
i < 0.
Let X(t) = {X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)}. We assume that X(·) is an
irreducible discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) over a fi-
nite state space S ⊆ ∏i∈[n] Si. Note that we do not assume
here that the net generation processes associated with the
individual users are independent.1 We make the assumption
that P [X(t+1) = s | X(t) = s]> 0 for all s∈ S. Note that this
ensures aperiodicity of X(·).
Let pi = (pi(s),s ∈ S) denote the stationary distribution of
the DTMC X(·). We define the drift ∆i associated with user i
as her steady state average net generation:
∆i =∑
s∈S
sipi(s),
where s = (s1, . . . ,sn). User i is said to be net generative if
∆i > 0 and net demanding if ∆i < 0. The system drift ∆ is
defined the sum of the user drifts, i.e., ∆= ∑i∈[n]∆i.
A common battery with capacity bmax ∈N is shared between
the users. The battery occupancy at time t is a random variable
1It is straightforward to generalize our results to the more general setting
where the vector of net generations is itself a function of an abstract
background Markov process. This generalization allows for an arbitrary state
space desciption that might, for example, incorporate history and/or weather
information.
3denoted by B(t). (X(t),B(t)) is a controlled Markov process
evolving over
S = S× [bmax]. (1)
Battery dynamics are given by
B(t+1) = B(t)+ ∑
i∈[n]
Ai(t), (2)
where Ai(t) denotes the energy accepted from user i (when
Ai(t) ≥ 0) or the energy supplied to user i (when Ai(t) < 0).
We assume that the actions Ai(t), i ∈ [n] at each time instant t
are chosen by the battery operator as a function of the state
history (X(s),B(s)), s≤ t.
The battery management algorithm is constrained as fol-
lows. In state (x,b)∈ S, the space of allowable actions, denoted
by A(x,b), is given by:
A(x,b) =
{
(a1, . . . ,an) | ai ∈
{
{0, . . . ,xi}, if xi ≥ 0
{xi, . . . ,0}, if xi < 0
,
0≤ b+ ∑
i∈[n]
ai ≤ bmax
}
(3)
A =
⋃
(x,b)∈S
A(x,b)
The above constraints restrict the amount of energy supplied
to a user by the amount demanded and similarly restricts the
amount of energy accepted from a user by her net surplus. In
addition, the actions must also respect the capacity constraints
of the battery, and that the battery cannot be discharged
below 0.
C. Loss of Load Rate (LLR)
Our notion of efficiency is defined by the loss of load rate.
The loss of load rate (LLR) for user i, denoted by LLRi, is
defined as:
LLRi := lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}(Ai(t)−Xi(t))] (4)
Note that LLRi ≥ 0, since Ai(t) ≥ Xi(t) when Xi(t) < 0
from (3). LLRi captures the long run average rate of unmet
demand for user i. For a system of n users, we define the LLR
of the system to be the sum of LLRs of the individual users,
i.e., LLRsys = ∑i∈[n]LLRi.
III. MAXIMIZING EFFICIENCY WITH HARD CONSTRAINTS
ON FAIRNESS
In this section, we study the tradeoff between efficiency
and fairness by putting a hard constraint on fairness and
optimizing efficiency under this constraint. The notion of
fairness we consider is that for each user, the time-averaged
amount of energy drawn from the battery is at most the time-
averaged amount of energy injected into the battery by that
user. Efficiency is measured using the LLR. We formulate this
problem as a constrained Markov decision process, and based
on this formulation, derive fundamental limits on the efficiency
achievable under fairness constraints.
A. Constrainted Markov decision process formulation
In this section, we impose a set of service constraints that
the battery management algorithm must satisfy, in order to
impart fairness in battery scheduling.
FCi : lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Ai(t)]≥0. (5)
FCi asks that the amount of energy we provide to each user is
at most the amount of energy the user injects into the battery.
We call limT→∞ 1T ∑
T
t=0E[Ai(t)] the net contribution (Ci) of
source i. We impose that the battery management algorithm
satisfy FCi for all i ∈ [n], collectively referred to as fairness
constraints.
We consider the problem of operating the system under
fairness constraints so that LLRsys is minimized. This problem
is an instance of a constrained Markov decision process (we
refer the reader to [9] for a survey), or CMDP with the
average cost criterion. The state space is given by (1), and
the set of allowable actions for each state is given by (3). The
problem, for a fixed initial distribution on the state space, is
summarized below:
(P) minimize
φ
lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
∑
i∈[N]
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}(Ai(t)−Xi(t))]
subject to lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Ai(t)]≥0 ∀i ∈ [n].
Here the decision variable is φ , a randomized, history-
dependent policy. A randomized policy is a sequence of
functions φ(t), t ∈ N that map the set of histories until time t
to probability distributions on the set of available actions at
time t. The set of available actions in state (x,b) ∈ S is given
by (3). A deterministic policy maps the set of histories to
a specific available action at each time t ∈ N. A policy is
Markov if it depends only on current state (X(t),b(t)) and it
is stationary if φ(t) does not depend on t.
The CMDP (P) is tractable since it can be solved by solving
an equivalent linear problem (LP) (see [9], [10]); we do
not provide the details of this reduction here due to space
constraints, though we do present the LP reduction for the
CMDP posed in Section V for optimization of fairness given
a hard constraint on efficiency. Note also that the CMDP (P) is
defined for a given initial distribution on S; as such its optimal
value depends on this initial distribution. However, the choice
of this initial distribution does not affect the results we derive
in this paper.
B. Fundamental limits
Denote the set of net demanding and net generating sources
by
D := {i ∈ [n]|∆i < 0}, G := {i ∈ [n]|∆i > 0}.
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the objec-
tive of (P) under any policy.
Theorem 3.1:
LLRsys ≥ ∑
i∈D
(−∆i).
4Proof: It suffices to prove the stated lower bound
on LLRsys under any feasible policy for (P).
LLRi = lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}(Ai(t)−Xi(t))]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}Ai(t)]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)> 0}Xi(t)]− lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Xi(t)]
(a)
≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}Ai(t)]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[I{Xi(t)> 0}Ai(t)]− lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Xi(t)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Ai(t)]− lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Xi(t)]
(b)
≥ − lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Xi(t)] =−∆i
The inequality (a) follows since Ai(t)≤ Xi(t) when Xi(t)> 0.
The inequality (b) is a consequence of our fairness constraint.
The statement of the lemma now follows by summing over all
net demanding sources.
The above bound shows that LLRsys remains bounded away
from zero when D 6= /0 for any battery size. We next consider
the case when all sources are net generative, i.e., G = [n].
We show that in this case the optimal LLRsys goes down
to zero exponentially with increasing battery size. To show
this, we upper bound the optimal LLRsys by an expression
which exponentially decays to 0. For this, we extensively use
Theorem A.1 from Appendix A. It shows that the optimal LLR
for a single net generating user decays exponentially in battery
size. Using this, we now show that the exponential decay of
the optimal LLR is true even for multiple sources, if all of
them are net generating.
Theorem 3.2: If G = [n], we have
limsup
bmax→∞
log(LLRo)
bmax
=−c,
where LLRo denotes the optimal LLR, bmax is the battery size
and c is a positive constant.
Proof: We upper bound the solution of (P) by considering
a particular policy. We divide the battery into n equal chunks
of size bmaxn , allocating one chunk to each user. Consider
the policy that optimally schedules each user using only the
battery chunk allocated to her; as we mention in Appendix A,
simple greedy operation is optimal when a battery (chunk) is
used by used by a single user. Moreover, it is easy to see that
this policy is fair.
Under the above policy, let LLRi denote the loss of load
rate of source i. Then, the LLRsys of the combined system
under this policy is ∑ni=1 LLRi. We know from Theorem A.1
that
lim
bmax→∞
log(LLRi)
bmax
=−ci, (6)
for some positive constant ci. Without loss of generality, let
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . .≤ cn. It is not hard to see now that
limsup
bmax→∞
log(LLRsys)
bmax
=−c1,
which implies the statement of the theorem.
IV. PRICE OF FAIRNESS
In this section, we analyse the efficiency implications of the
fairness constraint (5) in the LLR optimization formulation (P)
introduced in the previous section. We introduce the notion
of Price of Fairness (PoF), which is the ratio of the optimal
LLR subject to the fairness constraint, to the optimal LLR
without this constraint. The main conclusion of this section
is that the PoF can be arbitrarily large, even when all users
are net generative. This means that imposing a strong fairness
constraint in battery sharing can result in a substantial loss of
efficiency. In the following section, we address this issue by
proposing an alternative formulation that seeks to maximize
fairness subject to maximal efficiency.
To define PoF, let LLRe denote the optimal loss of load rate
without the fairness constraint, i.e.,
LLRe := min
φ
lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
n
∑
i=1
E[I{Xi(t)< 0}(Ai(t)−Xi(t))].
We refer to policies that solve the above optimization as
efficient policies. It is not hard to see that the optimal loss
of load rate is achieved by any greedy policy that (i) always
charges the battery whenever energy is available, and (ii) al-
ways meets user demand whenever feasible. Formally, any
policy that chooses actions that satisfy the following conditions
is efficient.
E1. If 0≤ b+∑i∈[n] xi ≤ bmax, then a = x.
E2. If b+∑i∈[n] xi > bmax, then ai = xi for all i satisfying
xi < 0, and b+∑i∈[n] ai = bmax.
E3. If b+∑i∈[n] xi < 0, then ai = xi for all i satisfying xi > 0,
and b+∑i∈[n] ai = 0.
Let the space of actions (a1, . . . ,an) that satisfy the above
efficiency conditions in state (x,b) be denoted by Ae(x,b)
and the history dependent policies that satisfy these action
constraints be denoted by Φe.
The price of fairness (PoF) is defined as
PoF =
LLRo
LLRe
. (7)
To analyse the PoF, we first consider the case where there is
at least one net demanding source. In this case, if the system
drift is itself negative, it is easy to see that LLRo is bounded
away from zero (using the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 3.1). Thus, the more interesting case is ∆ > 0. In
this case, the following lemma shows that the PoF grows to
infinity as bmax→ ∞.
Lemma 4.1: Suppose that |D | ≥ 1 (i.e., ∆i < 0 for some i)
but the system is net generative (i.e., ∆> 0). Then PoF → ∞
as bmax→ ∞.
Proof: By Theorem 3.1, LLRo is bounded away from zero
for any value of bmax. However, LLRe decays exponentially
5with bmax; this is because under an efficient policy, one can
think of the resulting LLR as arising from a single user
with net generation process ∑i∈[n]Xi(·). The exponential decay
of LLRe with bmax now follows from Theorem A.1 in the
appendix.
Next, we consider the case where all users are net gen-
erating. In this case, one might expect that a strict fairness
constraint does not affect efficiency. However, as the following
lemma shows, the PoF can be arbitrarily large even when all
sources are net generating.
Lemma 4.2: Given any M > 0, one can construct a system
instance where G = [n], such that the PoF ≥M.
Proof: We will construct an instance with 2 users that
satisfies PoF ≥M for any arbitrary positive threshold M. The
full details of the construction are rather cumbersome; we
provide a sketch of the argument below.
For users 1 and 2, we construct two independent net gen-
eration processes such that the LLR decay rate corresponding
to each user operating alone (the framework analysed in the
appendix) is distinct, i.e., λ1 < λ2. In this case, it can be shown
(using the precise charactization of the decay rate from large
deviations theory) that the decay rate λe associated with battery
sharing between the users under an efficient policy satisfies
λe ∈ (λ1,λ2). Denoting the standalone LLR of user i by LLRo,i,
this implies
lim
bmax→∞
LLRo,1
LLRe
= ∞.
Thus, there exists b¯max > 0 such that
LLRo,1(b¯max)
LLRe(b¯max)
> 2M.
From hereon, we freeze the battery size to this value b¯max, so
the dependence of LLR on b¯max will be suppressed.
Let δ = LLRo,1. We now perturb the net generation process
of user 2 as follows: X˜2(s) = X2(s)+a, for a≥ 0 such that
∑
s∈S
spi(s)I{X˜(s)< 0} ∈ (−δ/2,0).
Note that quantities in the perturbed system are represented
with a tilde accent. In the perturbed system, user 2 is more
generating than in the original system, and the rate at which
it demands energy from the system is at most δ/2.
It is easy to see that L˜LRe ≤ LLRe. Moreover, in the
perturbed system operated under the fairness constraint, the
rate at which energy is accepted from user 2 is at most δ/2.
This means that the reduction in the LLR of user 1 is at most
δ/2 relative to standalone operation, i.e.,
L˜LRo ≥ LLRo,1− δ2 ≥
1
2
LLRo,1.
Thus,
P˜oF =
L˜LRo
L˜LRe
≥ 1
2
LLRo,1
LLRe
= M.
This completes the proof.
An example of the phenomenon of unbounded PoF when
all sources are net generating is shown in Figure 1a. Note that
the above theorem does not show that the PoF for a given net
generation profile grows to infinity as bmax→∞; see Figure 1b,
where PoF seems to saturate with increasing bmax.
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Fig. 1: These figures show the change in price of fairness as
battery size increases when the sources are independent. S =
{−1,1}n and Pi denotes the transition matrix of source i.
V. OPTIMIZING FAIRNESS SUBJECT TO EFFICIENCY
It is clear from Section IV that there exist cases, in which the
Price of Fairness becomes unbounded as battery size increases.
In this section, we formulate a problem in which we try to
maximize fairness subject to efficiency, i.e., we pose being
efficient as a hard constraint and ask how fair can we get?
We first define the objective which captures the fairness in
the system. Our notion of fairness is to minimize the maximum
over all users, the amount a user draws minus the amount
it supplies to the battery. Recall the net contribution Ci =
limT→∞ 1T ∑
T
t=0E[Ai(t)] of user i defined in Section III. Now,
by work conservation we have under any policy, ∑i∈[n]Ci = 0.
The system is said to be completely fair when Ci = 0 ∀i ∈
[n]. In general, this may not be the case. Hence to maximize
fairness, we maximize the minimum of Ci.
Here, by being efficient, we mean being in the space of
policies which minimize the LLR without the hard fairness
constraint. In general, the optimal value of an objective, in
this case fairness, over an arbitrary set of policies is not easily
computable. However, an observation we made in Section IV
allows to formulate this as a tractable problem. Recall from
Section IV that efficient policies are those that take actions
in the space Ae(x,b) when the state is (x,b) ∈ S. As a
consequence, the space of efficient policies can be described
by specifying only the space of allowable actions. This allows
us to formulate this problem as a CMDP.
Thus, we define the problem of maximizing fairness subject
to efficiency as follows
max
φ∈Φe
min
i∈[n]
lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=0
E[Ai(t)], (8)
where the maximization is over all φ that are efficient, i.e.,
that are constrained to take actions in Ae(x,b) in every state
(x,b). This problem can also be formulated as a CMDP as
follows
(F) maximize
φ ,θ
θ
subject to θ ≤ limT→∞
1
T ∑
T
t=0E[Ai(t)], ∀i ∈ [n],
φ ∈ Φe.
6A. Reduction to a Linear Program
The optimization problem (F) above is extremely complex
since the class of all history dependent policies is a highly
unstructured space. This makes it extremely hard to derive
a policy or a battery management algorithm. However, a
remarkable simplification is possible, which allows for the
computation of such policies in an efficient manner.
A Markov decision process is said to be unichain if, under
any stationary deterministic policy, the corresponding Markov
chain contains a single (aperiodic) ergodic class. This ensures
the existence of a unique stationary distribution, indepen-
dent of the initial distribution. Notice that under any policy
φ ∈ Φe the battery dynamics are identical and deterministic.
Consequently, under any policy φ ∈ Φe, the Markov chain
(X(t),b(t)) has a single ergodic class, making this CMDP
unichain. A well-known fact about unichain CMDPs is that
stationary randomized policies dominate (see, e.g., Theorem
4.1 of [9]); thanks to this, we can limit our search to stationary
randomized policies. Moreover, the CMDP admits an elegant
equivalent linear programming formulation (Theorem 4.3 of
[9]), where the optimization is not over policies, but rather
over occupation measures (or probability distributions) on
the product of state and action spaces. We introduce this
formulation below.
An occupation measure ρ is a probability distribution on
S×Ae, where Ae = ⋃(x,b)∈S Ae(x,b). In the LP formulation,
the occupation measure is required to satisfy,
∑
(x,b)∈S
∑
a∈Ae(x,b)
ρ(x,b,a) = 1, ρ(x′,b′,a′)≥ 0, (9)
∑
(x,b)∈S
∑
a∈Ae(x,b)
ρ(x,b,a)(δ(x′,b′)(x,b)−P(x′,b′|a,x,b)) = 0
(10)
∀(x′,b′) ∈ S,a′ ∈ Ae, where,
δ(u,v)(u′,v′) =
{
1, if u = u′ and v = v′,
0, otherwise,
and P(x′,b′|a,x,b) is the probability of transition from state
(x,b) to state (x′,b′) under action a ∈ Ae(x′,b′). In our case,
these dynamics are trivial:
P(x′,b′|a,x,b) = P(x′|x)I{b′ = b+ ∑
i∈[n]
ai},
and P(x′|x) is the probability that the background process X(t)
transitions from x to x′. (9) encodes that ρ is a probability
distribution on S×Ae. (10) imposes that ρ is an invariant
distribution for the controlled Markov chain.
The equivalent LP formulation of (F) is then given by [9]:
(LP) maximize
ρ,θ
θ
subject to θ ≤ ∑
s+i
u=s−i
ρ(ai = u)u, ∀i ∈ [n],
ρ ∈ ρe.
Here, ρe is the set of ρ that satisfy (9)-(10), and with a slight
abuse of notation, we define
ρ(ai = u) = ∑
(x,b,a)∈S×Ae: ai=u
ρ(x,b,a).
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Fig. 2: This figure shows how the maxmin fairness varies
with increasing battery size. S = {−1,1}n and Pi denotes the
transition matrix of source i. We have the following sources and
n = k implies a system which has first k of these sources.2
P1 =
[
0.5 0.5
0.6 0.4
]
, P2 =
[
0.5 0.5
0.8 0.2
]
, P3 =
[
0.7 0.3
0.7 0.3
]
, P4 =
[
0.8 0.2
0.4 0.6
]
.
The first constraint in (LP) arises from the fairness definition,
restated using occupation measures. This formulation allows
for efficient computation of the optimal fairness. We next
prove a result giving structural properties of efficient policies.
Proposition 5.1: Under any efficient policy, the battery
dynamics remain the same. Moreover, the underlying marginal
distribution over states (ρ(x,b) ∀x,b ∈ S) is the same across
efficient policies.
Proof: Using E1, E2 and E3, we note that irrespective of
what actions we choose for each agent, the sum total of all
actions in Ae(x,b) is the same for each pair (x,b) ∈ S. Since
the battery dynamics are b(t+1) = b(t)+∑i ai(t), the battery
dynamics stay the same across efficient policies.
Using the first claim, we can see that the transition matrix
for (x,b) is the same across all efficient policies. Thus, ρ(x,b)
is the same across all efficient policies.
We have computed the solution to (LP) and the plot of
optimal fairness with increasing battery size for different
user configurations is given in Figure 2. We have taken the
background processes of the users to be independent for these
evaluations. From this plot, we can observe that the fairness
tends to saturate on increasing battery size, i.e. after a certain
threshold, the fairness value approaches a negative constant
(except for the case n = 1, where the efficient policy is also
fair). This illustrates that increasing the battery size does not
necessarily improve the fairness of efficient policies.
Figure 2 indicates that even a relaxation of the fairness
constraint in (P) to Ci ≥−δ for some δ > 0 is not guaranteed
to result in an efficient battery operation, even as bmax→ ∞.
To illustrate this explicitly, in Figure 3a and Figure 3b, we plot
the fairness efficiency frontier for 3 and 5 users, respectively.
These plots show how close we get to efficient operation by
relaxing the fairness constraint from Ci ≥ 0 to Ci ≥ −δ ∀i.
The shaded region shows all those points which are achievable
and the frontier is the boundary for the achievable region. For
the case when an efficient policy is fair, the frontier would
coincide with the axes.
2The irregularities for even number of users occur due to integer effects.
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(a) P1 =
[
0.6 0.4
0.6 0.4
]
, P2 =[
0.9 0.1
0.9 0.1
]
, P3 =
[
0.6 0.4
0.5 0.5
]
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(b) P1 =
[
0.7 0.3
0.4 0.6
]
, P2 =[
0.6 0.4
0.9 0.1
]
, P3 =
[
0.6 0.4
0.2 0.8
]
, P4 =[
0.8 0.2
0.8 0.2
]
, P5 =
[
0.51 0.49
0.51 0.49
]
.
Fig. 3: These figures show the fairness efficiency frontier for
3 and 5 users respectively with bmax = 12, S = {−1,1}n and Pi
denotes the transition matrix of source i. This optimal loss of
load is denoted by LLRδ . The plot is of ε v/s δ , where ε =
LLRδ
LLRe −
1. and the fairness constraints are Ci ≥−δ .
This reveals a fundamental conflict between efficiency and
fairness: a small relaxation of the fairness constraint does
not necessarily improve efficiency, and a small relaxation of
the efficiency requirement does not necessarily imply fairness
for all users (this follows from our previous observation of
unbounded PoF).
To concretize our claim regarding the fundamental conflict
between efficiency and fairness, we show in the following
example that irrespective of the battery level, any efficient
policy always has a non-zero maxmin fair value. We consider
a setup of two users, wherein each user either generates unit
power or demands unit power at each time instant. Let the
transition probability matrix of user i be given by
Pi =
[
pi 1− pi
1−qi qi
]
. (11)
Then, we define the generation probability of user i by αi =
1−qi
2−pi−qi . Using this setup, we give the following proposition,
which gives a class of examples where the fairness remains
bounded away from zero under efficient policies. We denote
the maxmin fair value under efficient policies by Fe.
Proposition 5.2: Consider two users with S = {−1,1}2 and
the transition probability matrix of user i being Pi (as in (11)).
If α1 > α2, we have Fe = α2−α1 for all even battery sizes.
Proof: First, we note that ρ(b= k) = 0 for k odd. This is
because, for even battery size, we know that in the long run
the battery spends only finite amount of time in the odd battery
levels and spends an infinite amount of time in the even battery
levels. To see this, at each even battery level, we either accept
two units of power, accept one unit and give one unit, or supply
two units of power. Thus the battery level doesn’t change it’s
parity unless it hits a boundary. If the battery level is initially
odd, we know that it will hit either the upper boundary (bmax)
or the lower boundary (0) in finite time, both of which are
even. After this, the battery level stays even.
Let αi denote the generation probability of user i and let
α ′i = 1−αi. Let ρ(·, ·) denote the occupation measure of states
of any efficient policy (Prop. 5.1). We note that given that the
policy is efficient, from E1,E2 and E3, the freedom in the
action is only when the background state is x = (−1,−1) and
the battery level is b = 1 and when the background state is
x = (1,1) and the battery level is b = bmax−1. Let us assume
that when the background state is x= (−1,−1) and the battery
level is b= 1, we choose action a= (−1,0) with probability s
and action a=(0,−1) with probability 1−s. Also, assume that
when the background state is x = (1,1) and the battery level
is b = bmax−1, we choose action a = (1,0) with probability
t and action a = (0,1) with probability 1− t. Thus, we have,
C1−C2 =2(α1−α2)+(2t−1)ρ(x = (1,1),b = bmax−1)
− (2s−1)ρ(x = (−1,−1),b = 1).
Since ρ(b = k) = 0 for k odd, we have C1−C2 = 2(α1−α2).
Thus, we have C1 = α1−α2 and C2 = α2−α1. For α1 > α2,
C2 < C1 and hence Fe = α2−α1 for all even battery sizes.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
We studied the problem of scheduling of a shared energy
storage among multiple users by concentrating on the tradeoff
between fairness of use across users and the efficiency of use
of the battery. Our results show that there are hard fundamental
limits to fairness under efficiency constraints and to efficiency
under fairness constraints. In particular, a larger battery size
does not help in achieving both fairness and efficiency simul-
taneously. Our effort at characterizing these tradeoffs was via
optimization of efficiency subject to fairness (and vice-versa).
We have also simulated the fairness-efficiency frontier of levels
of efficiency and fairness that cannot be jointly improved upon
under any policy or battery size. Our results also indicate that
sharing contracts and costing of batteries should be done with
care since fair operations imply suboptimal battery utilization.
Devising an equitable sharing of costs and a market for
transacting excess energy are fascinating directions of future
research.
APPENDIX A
LARGE BATTERY ASYMPTOTICS FOR A SINGLE USER
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing the
LLR associated with a single user i operating a battery of size
bmax alone. We make the following remarks:
1) The net generation process Xi(·) corresponding to user i
is a functional of the DTMC X(·).
2) An elementary energy conservation argument shows that
any policy of battery operation for user i is fair with
respect to the fairness notion (5).
3) The LLR of user i is minimized by a simple greedy
policy: Suppose that the net generation is xi and the
battery occupancy equals b. If 0≤ b+x≤ bmax, set action
a = x. If b+ x < 0, set a = −b, and if b+ x > bmax, set
a = bmax− b. Under this policy, the battery evolution is
given by
B(t+1) = [B(t)+Xi(t)][0,bmax], (12)
where [z][0,bmax] = min(max(z,0),bmax).
The main result of this section is that if ∆i > 0, then LLRo,i,
the optimal LLR for user i, decays exponentially with the
battery size bmax.
8Theorem A.1: For user i operating a battery of size bmax in
a standalone fashion, if ∆i > 0, then
lim
bmax→∞
log(LLRo,i)
bmax
=−λi,
where λi ∈ (0,∞).
Theorem A.1 is a consequence of the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1: Let the setting of Theorem A.1 hold. Under
the battery evolution given by (12),
lim
bmax→∞
log(LLRo,i)
bmax
= lim
bmax→∞
logP [B = 0]
bmax
.
where B is distributed according to the steady state distribution
of B(·)
Proof: It is easy to see that LLRo,i ≤ P [B = 0] . It
therefore suffices to show that LLRo,i ≥ cP [B = 0] for some
c ∈ (0,1). This is a direct consequence of our assumption that
P [X(t+1) = s | X(t) = s] > 0 for all s ∈ S, which ensures
that each time the battery drains to zero, there is positive
probability of a loss of load. This argument can be easily
formalized using the renewal reward theorem.
Lemma A.2: Let the setting of Theorem A.1 hold. Under
the battery evolution given by (12),
lim
bmax→∞
logP [B = 0]
bmax
=−λi,
where λi ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: We analyse the asymptotics of P [b = 0] using the
reversed system [11], which is obtained by interchanging the
role of generation and demand. In other words, X ri (t) =−Xi(t)
(we use the superscript r to represent quantities in the reversed
system). Thus, ∆ri =−∆i < 0. It is not hard to see that
P [B = 0] = P [Br = bmax] .
The battery evolution in the reversed system is equivalent
to the buffer evolution in a finite buffer Markov modulated
queue with negative drift, for which logarithmic asymptotics
of the form
lim
bmax→∞
logP [Br = bmax]
bmax
=−λ
are known; see [12, Section 6.5] and [13].
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